Abstract: Increased growth of information technology in healthcare has led to a situation where the security of patient information is more important and is a critical issue. The aim of the proposed algorithm is to provide a framework to verify the integrity of the medical images. In this paper, the integrity of the medical images is verified by embedding hash signatures using the sequential square embedding technique. This technique is as efficient as the diamond encoding technique but with increased payload capability. The medical image is first divided into the region of interest (ROI) block and the signature block. The hash signatures are determined by dividing the ROI into nonoverlapping blocks. During the data hiding stage, the hash signatures are embedded in randomly chosen pixel pairs in the signature block using the sequential square encoding (SSE) technique. In the experimental results, the data hiding capacity of the proposed SSE technique is verified in terms of peak signal-to-noise ratio. Also, the medical image integrity is substantiated by comparing the L 2 norm between computed and extracted hash signatures. Modifications such as contrast enhancement, rotation, scaling, and changing the image information result in increased L 2 norm; thus, the integrity of the medical images can be verified. The parameters required for embedding, such as the embedding parameter and the seed for random sequence generation, are encrypted and communicated to the receiving end. Hence, the proposed algorithm provides a secure framework for medical image integrity verification.
Introduction
Medical imaging plays a vital role in health informatics, as it aids in diagnosis and decision-making. Tremendous progress in information and communication technologies has enabled easier access, modification, and distribution of digital data. New challenges, especially those related to security, arise when these evolving techniques are applied to healthcare systems. Sensitive data related to a patient demands further measures such as confidentiality and data integrity to ensure that the trustworthiness of the data is asserted. During communication, medical images can be tampered vindictively by introducing or removing a lesion leading to misdiagnosis by the physician. The main concern of researchers in this community is to provide new ways to address the above-mentioned issues seamlessly and efficiently.
Several techniques are available in the literature that can warrant the security and privacy of the medical images. These techniques include encryption [9, 20, 23] , watermarking [4, 7, 27] , image signatures or hashes [31] , and blind forensics methods [11, 15] . Encryption provides protection of images; once decrypted, the security is lost, whereas watermarking can detect if the integrity of images is compromised. Cryptographic hashbased integrity verification methods verify the exact identity of images. Blind forensic-based methods require no prior knowledge about the original image, and these methods reveal the statistical nature of modification by extracting images features and discriminating using a classifier.
Recently, watermarking is a proven and effective tool for endorsing image integrity [28, 32, 33, 37, 41, 42] . This technique involves embedding a specific watermark and nondetection of the same conveys the loss in integrity. In Ref. [12] , digital watermarking perspectives with respect to medical data management and distribution are discussed and a complementary tool to address medical data protection, archive, retrieval, and authentication is proposed. Multiple watermarks conveying patients' data are embedded on the medical images. In Ref. [11] , the image forensic tools are categorized as (1) techniques that detect anomalies introduced at pixel level, (2) techniques that introduce the statistical correlation influence from a lossy compression scheme, (3) techniques that use the camera lens, sensor, and postprocessing artifacts, (4) techniques that model the interaction between physical objects, camera, and light in three dimensions, and (5) techniques that employ object measurements in the world space and their relative position with respect to the camera.
Often, metadata and watermarking are used as security mechanisms to ensure the integrity and authenticity of information. In Ref. [18] , a cryptographic method is used to improve the trustworthiness of the images. Thus, a stronger link can be provided between the image and its integrity and authenticity without compromising the quality of the image. In Ref. [7] , medical images are made more usable by watermarking it with a knowledge digest. The knowledge digest can be employed for retrieving images with similar or different diagnosis. Watermarking is used to embed the knowledge digest in the pixel gray levels instead of adding extra header information.
In Ref. [27] , the integrity of the medical image is verified using digital signatures and the reversible watermarking technique because the modification of images with sensitive content may affect their interpretation. The integrity of the image is verified using cryptographic hash embedding methods and the performance of five reversible watermarking methods was tested for images captured under different imaging modalities.
Validating the authenticity of the images using blind forensics has recently gained immense attention. These methods, based on classifier mechanism, can detect any change in the image without a priori knowledge. In Ref. [15] , a Tchebichef moment together with discrete cosine transform (DCT) is used for authenticating the medical images. The newly proposed feature set is named as histogram statistics of reorganized block-based Tchebichef moments. This method not only detects whether the test image has undergone a global modification but also detects the nature of the modification. In Ref. [8] , the geometric moments are used to approximate the local alteration by the closest generalized Gaussian distribution. A classifier-based strategy with the ratio between the original and recomputed moments as a feature is used to identify the nature of the modification.
In Ref. [34] , the low-frequency discrete wavelet transform (DWT) subbands of the cover image and the watermark are decomposed using DCT and singular value decomposition (SVD). Here, the watermarked image is generated by embedding the S component of the watermark on that of the cover. Security in medical information exchanged can be achieved using crypto-based approaches such as symmetric encryption, hashing, and digital signature [5] . The confidentiality of the images can be attained using symmetric encryption using block and stream ciphers, whereas the authenticity and strict integrity of the images can be verified using hashing. In Ref. [1] , two crypto-based algorithms for verifying the authenticity, confidentiality, and integrity of DICOM images are proposed. Cryptographic functions that can generate strong symmetric keys and hash, both internally and externally, are used for the implementation.
Recently, several watermarking algorithms are proposed in the wavelet domain [34, 35, 38, 40] . In Ref. [37] , the effect of error-correction codes such as Reed-Solomon, Bose, Ray-Chaudhuri, and Hocquenghem (BCH), Hamming, and hybrid error correcting and repetition codes are examined based on its robustness and imperceptibility. Using DWT and SVD, a dual watermarking scheme is proposed. In Ref. [35] , the DWT-and SVD-based multiple watermarking scheme is presented. The watermark to be embedded is generated after encryption and encoding the text. In Ref. [36] , a pseudo-noise random sequence with respect to the corresponding watermarking bit is generated using secure spread spectrum technique. The coefficients that are possible candidates for watermark are selected using the thresholding technique. The watermarking sequence is then embedded into the selected DWT coefficients in a column wise order. In Ref. [10] , the medical image is segmented into region of interest (ROI) and region of noninterest (RONI). Hash generated from the ROI is embedded in the RONI region along with the ROI recovery data and patient's personal data using integer wavelet transform. This technique requires the support of the physician to mark the ROI and to separate the RONI. However, it is practically impossible to mark the same region while extracting the watermark.
In this paper, hash signatures are computed from the medical image using SVD. In general, the ROI of a medical image normally lies in the center of the image. In the proposed work, a rectangular area is defined based on the number of cover pixels required to embed the hash signatures. The digital signature is then embedded into the rectangular RONI area in the image using the proposed sequential square encoding (SSE) technique. At the receiving end, the signature is extracted and compared to the hash recomputed from the watermarked image. The L2 norm is used to determine the integrity of the medical image. The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the statistical models used for describing the wavelet coefficients of the SAR image in intensity format and the noise. Section 3 proposes the parameter estimation technique and the bivariate shrinkage estimation. Section 4 discusses the experimental results.
Proposed Medical Integrity Verification System
The structure of the proposed integrity verification system is portrayed in Figures 1 and 2 . At the protection stage, the input image is padded to form a square array and is grouped into blocks of N × N pixels. Hash generator is used to compute the signatures from each block. The signatures are then postprocessed to convert the hash signature, H ∈ ℝ to H ∈ ℤ, to make it suitable for the embedding process. Protected image is obtained by watermarking the signatures using the SSE technique.
At the receiver end, image under investigation undergoes a similar procedure such as the sender side and is grouped into nonoverlapping blocks of N × N pixels. The hash signatures are computed and postprocessed. The watermarked signature is extracted and compared to the recomputed hash signature. The integrity of the image is verified if the extracted and recomputed hash signatures are similar. 
Hash Signatures
The hash generator converts the input image into a short binary string representation, which is dependent on its appearance to the human eye. This implies that the original image and the image under investigation yield similar hash values when the image is untampered. In Ref. [19] , SVD-based hash function along with a secret key is used to authenticate images. The advantage of SVD is that it provides the best lower dimension approximation to a matrix. Also, it can be used to capture the semiglobal features and geometric information of the images compactly. The secret key is used as a seed for generating pseudo-random (PR) numbers. The pixels in the nonoverlapping blocks are quantized using a randomized quantizer that uses PR seed, RS. Randomized rounding is used to minimize the probability of hash collision for two distinct inputs. Because the input cannot be modified, the randomness in the hash function's output can be obtained only by randomized rounding. Let I denote the input medical image and A i denote the ith subimage. The SVD of the subimage is given by
where U i and V i are the N × T and T × N orthogonal matrices, respectively, and D i is a T × T diagonal matrix consisting of singular values along the diagonal. In SVD, the largest singular values are maximized and the greatest amount of variance-covariance structure is accounted by for the first eigen image pattern [3] . The hash vector of the given subimage A i is obtained by reapplying SVD to a feature vector. The feature vector is a collection of singular vectors on the left and right of the eigen image with the maximum value. The singular vectors are used to denote the geometry of the image. Two-level SVD helps to enhance the robustness of the hash vector and more than two stages would affect the perceptual qualities of the hash severely [24] . The hash vector thus obtained is converted into integers to make it suitable for the embedding process using the data hiding technique.
Secured Signature Watermarking Using SSE
A variant of pixel pair matching and EMD scheme, called diamond encoding (DE), is proposed in Ref. [6] , where the secret digit is concealed in a B-ary notational system, where B = 2k 2 + 2k + 1, k ≥ 1. DE embeds a B-ary digit into m × n cover pixels. DE can achieve enhanced payload when compared to EMD, whereas it preserves the quality of the stego image. The adaptive pixel pair matching (APPM) technique is devised to eliminate the distortion introduced by diamond shape in DE, when k > 2 [14] . However, this approach involves a discrete optimization problem to be solved to determine the parameters used to identify the neighborhood set.
In DE, a diamond characteristic value (DCV) of a pixel pair (x, y) is computed using a diamond function f d , where f d (x,y) = ((2k + 1)x + y)mod B, as shown in Figure 3 . In the proposed work, the embedding capacity of DE can be improved by replacing the diamond shape in DE with SSE technique. Figure 4 shows the pattern used in the proposed SSE technique and it can be observed that the proposed pattern is compact enough to eliminate the distortion introduced by the diamond pattern in DE. The characteristic function for SSE is obtained by modifying the DCV as ( , ) ( (2 1) )mod
where M = (2k + 1) 2 and k is the embedding parameter. The length of the binary message S can be determined using the size of the block fixed to determine the hash signatures.
Here, N denotes the block size and m × n denotes the row and column size of the image. The embedding parameter k can be determined by finding the minimum positive integer that satisfies
Substituting M = (2k + 1) 2 , and rearranging the inequality, we get
Here, x     is the greatest integer function and x     is the least integer function. The embedding parameter k is obtained by determining the minimal positive integer satisfying the inequality in Equation (4).
The proposed work aims to extract the hash signature from the image whose integrity is to be verified and is used to watermark the image. The size of the hash signature is very less compared to the size of the medical image and the practical values of k rarely exceed 2. Table 1 portrays the various k-values obtained for an image of size 256 × 256 and the number of secret digits generated from the hash signature computed on blocks comprising N × N pixels. Thus, SSE is an optimal choice over APPM, which is computationally complex. In the proposed work, one secret digit is stored in two cover pixels. Thus, a cover image of 256 × 256 requires 49152 cover pixels to contain 24576 secret digits when the image is divided into blocks of 8 × 8 pixels.
In SSE, the CV of a pixel pair (x,y) is computed using the characteristic function in Equation (2) . The hash signatures are converted into binary stream and then it is transformed into M-ary signature digit. To embed a signature digit s B , SSE calculates the modulus distance between the signature digit and the characteristic function at (x,y) as ( ( , ))mod
The distance d can be used to find a coordinate ( , )
d d
x y from the neighborhood set P k as shown in Figure 2 . The pixel pair (x, y) is replaced with (x′, y′), where ˆd x x x = + ′ and ˆd y y y = + ′ . These procedures are repeated until all the signature digits are embedded. The data embedding procedure in DE selects the pixel pairs from two adjacent nonoverlapping two-pixel blocks. The attacker can easily determine the pixel pairs that are used for embedding the message digits. This problem can be eliminated by constructing a nonrepeating random embedding sequence Q using a random seed RS. The RS is unique for every communication between the sender and the receiver, and even if the attacker eavesdrops, he will be unable to predict. Using the dual-key RSA algorithm explained in the following section, the embedding parameter k and the RS are encrypted and are denoted as k enc and RS enc , respectively. Then, k enc and RS enc are communicated to the receiver end. This ensures that the parameter exchange is tamper resistant. At the receiver end, pixels are scanned in the same order as in the embedding phase using the decrypted RS dec . The CV of the pixel pair (x′, y′) is used to extract the secret digit as .
Key Generation and Encryption/Decryption
Security and authentication of data over the network are commonly provided using symmetric key algorithm, asymmetric key algorithm, and digital signatures. Symmetric key algorithm is based on substitution and permutation operations. Here, the same key is shared between two parties for data exchange, and key exchange is one of the main concerns. The key should be protected from third party and should be frequently changed for better security. A larger key size generally ensures a greater security, but it could slow down the algorithm. DES, RC2, RC4, IDEA, GOST, and SAFEN use symmetric key algorithm for encryption/decryption. The asymmetric key algorithm, on the contrary, is dependent on exponential, multiplication, and division rather than substitution and permutation. Also, it uses a public and private key pair; the public key is used for encryption and the secret private key is used for decryption. Deffi-Hellman, RSA, DSA, and Knapsack are examples of asymmetric key algorithms. The third category, digital signatures, is commonly used for data authentication. A digital signature can be created by encrypting the message with the sender's private key and is appended to the message. At the receiver, the message and the signature are decrypted using the receiver's private key.
In the proposed work, a dual-key RSA is incorporated for data exchange between the sender and the receiver end. Initially, two distinct random numbers are shared between both ends. Let p and q denote the first prime number next to the two random numbers. Let the integer I = p * q be the RSA modulus or simply the modulus. Let the Euler's phi function, ϕ(I) is given by ϕ(I) = (p − 1) * (q − 1). A random number generator at the sender and the receiver end is used to generate the private keys S private and R private , respectively. Their corresponding public keys are generated using 
such that S public * S private = 1 mod ϕ(I) and R public * R private = 1 mod ϕ(I). The pairs (S public , I) and (R public , I) are the public keys for the sender and the receiver, respectively. The pairs (S private , I) and (R private , I) are the private keys for the sender and the receiver, respectively.
Encryption: A plaintext E ∈ ℤ N is encrypted using the sender's private key S private and receiver's public key R public , and the cipher text is obtained as private public
where I ∈ ℤ N . This scheme provides both confidentiality and authentication.
Decryption:
A cipher text C ∈ ℤ N for a given plaintext message E ∈ ℤ N is decrypted using the receiver's private key R private and the sender's public key S public and the deciphered text is obtained as
The receiver's private key is used for deciphering the message and the sender's public key is used to authenticate it.
Demonstration of the SSE Technique
Let us consider a simple example to demonstrate the above-mentioned process. An input image J of 65536 pixels (256 × 256) when divided into 16 × 16 pixels yields a hash signature of 32768 bits, which can be preprocessed to form 12288 secret digits. Hence, it requires 24576 cover pixels for hiding. In Table 1 To embed a signature digit 9 25 , the modulus distance is obtained as d = (9 - f s (2,60))mod 25 = 14. In Figure 2 , determine 14 14 ( , ) . Thus, the image J′ with signatures hidden using the SSE method can be obtained. On the receiver end, the signature digit can be extracted as s B = f s (0, 59) = (5 × 0 + 59)mod 25 = 9 25 .
Experimental Results
The performance of the proposed algorithm is verified on images from a range of standard medical image data sets [2, 16, 17, 39] . The proposed SSE technique tends to modify the image intensities while hiding the signature digit. Hence, the image is divided into ROI block and signature block. In most practical applications, the ROI is marked manually by a physician or an expert. It is often impossible to mark the same region in the sender as well as the receiver side. As useful information is rarely found on the boundaries of the medical image, a rectangular region that is located closer to the boundaries is chosen as a signature block and the remaining regions form a part of the ROI block. The size of the rectangular region is determined by blurring the input image using a circular averaging filter of radius 25 pixels. Then, the blurred image is binarized using the OTSU's threshold selection algorithm [26] . To accommodate the segmentation errors, the boundary is adjusted on all the sides by 10 pixels. Figure 5 shows the original medical image, binarized image, and ROI block represented by a red rectangle. The region outside the red rectangle denotes the signature block.
In Table 1 , it can be observed that 65536 bits of hash signature are generated for blocks of 8 × 8. Thus, it is sufficient for medical integrity applications to incorporate the data hiding algorithm with minimal payload. Also, the proposed integrity verification application should not use the ROI to hide the signature bits because it may affect the integrity of the given image. Thus, payload is not a constraint for the proposed technique. The hiding efficiency of the SSE algorithm can be verified by measuring the peak signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR) between the original image and the image in which hash signatures are embedded. Figure 6 shows the sample test images incorporated for analyzing the performance of the proposed algorithm. The PSNR performance of the proposed algorithm is compared to the latest data hiding techniques in Refs. [13, 21, 22, 25, 30] and is tabulated in Table 2 . Figure 7B -D shows various tamperings that can be done to a medical image by an attacker, such as contrast variation, rotation, and modification of image information. Let us assume that the parameters required for the proposed integrity verification method such as the RS, size of the nonoverlapping pixel blocks used by the hash generator, and embedding parameter k are communicated between the sender and the receiver through a secure channel.
Several evaluation parameters [29] such as PSNR, structural similarity index metric (SSIM), and correlation coefficient can be used to identify whether the image received is tampered or unaltered. SSIM is reported as a more reliable metric for assessing the visual quality. The mean SSIM is defined as
where X and Y are the cover and the watermarked images, respectively; M is the number of local windows in the image; SSIM is the structural similarity index metric, and x j and y j are the image contents at the jth local window. The SSIM is defined as The correlation coefficient can be computed as However, these metrics demand a copy of the original image without the watermark for evaluation, which is practically impossible. Thus, these metrics are not suitable for verifying the integrity of the images at the receiving end. This leads to the need of a metric that can be computed at the receiver end without information about original image intensities. Thus, L 2 norm, which is computed between the extracted embedded signatures and the hash signatures computed from the watermarked image, can be used as a metric to evaluate the security of the images. The L 2 norm between the extracted hash signatures H1 and the recomputed hash signatures H2 is given by The variations in the evaluation parameters under various circumstances are tabulated in Table 1 . It is evident that L 2 norm can be efficiently used as a metric to indicate the integrity of the image received. The L 2 norm values computed for various standard image data sets are averaged and are listed in Table 3 . For fair comparison, the medical images are resized to the standard size of 256 × 256 pixels. In Table 4 , it can be inferred that, for untampered images, the L 2 norm is always <0.005, which is chosen as the criteria for deciding whether the received image is tampered or unaltered. In Table 5 , the percentage of computation required by the individual phases of the proposed technique is analyzed. In Table 5 , it is evident that the data hiding and extraction algorithms require very less time when compared to the hash generation algorithm using SVD.
Conclusion
In this paper, an improved data hiding technique called the SSE is proposed. To verify the integrity of the medical images, the image is divided into the ROI block and the signature block. The hash signatures are obtained from the ROI block and are hidden in the signature block using the proposed SSE method. The advantage of the proposed method is that it provides high embedding capacity. Also, the information can be stored in a few pixels in the signature block. Experimental analysis reveals that the proposed technique embeds the signature without affecting the useful information available in the medical image. Several evaluation parameters such as PSNR, SSIM, and correlation coefficient can be used for checking the integrity of the images. However, they require the information about the original image before hiding the hash signatures. These evaluation parameters are obtained by modifying the standard medical data sets, and it is inferred that the integrity of medical images can be verified without the prior information using L 2 norm. In the future, the efficiency of the proposed technique can be improved by incorporated reversible data hiding techniques. Although the proposed SSE is computationally efficient, the maximum percentage of the total computational time is used for generating the hash signatures. In the future, a computationally effective signature generation algorithm can be devised to increase the efficiency of the overall integrity verification technique.
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